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Abstract: Nicaragua, the poorest country of Central American, gives shelter to many foreign owned 
plants in its free trade zones (export processing zones). In December 2006, some 80.000 persons worked 
in these industrial zones. The great majority of these plants belong to the clothing industry and most of 
them are of Asian capital. But, does this maquiladora industry - an assembly industry of imported 
intermediate goods that benefits from a preferential tax and tariff treatment - contribute to a genuine 
industrial development of Nicaragua? This paper tries to give some elements of answer to this question by 
studying the evolution of a Taiwanese maquiladora enterprise assembling jeans and casual wear in 
Nicaragua: Nien Hsing Textile Co. Our study casts doubts on the contribution of such a foreign enterprise 
to the development of a perennial local industrial structure: there are no backward linkages, the 
Nicaraguan employees are not qualified and realise manual and routine tasks, and management is mostly 
composed of expatriates. Moreover, our comparison between the situation in 2007 and the one in 1998 
shows us that there have no been significant changes: the enterprise remains an economic enclave 
manufacturing a basic or standardized garment whose permanence in the country still depends on specific 
trade policy advantages (with an expiry date) enjoyed by Nicaragua.  
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“(The foreign enterprises operating in the Nicaraguan free trade zone constitute) the snow that lies on 
the mountain peak and that, during the thaw, becomes water that aids the valley terrain to become more 
fertile” (Mr. España Olivero2, advisor from the Nicaragua Department for Industry and Commerce). 
 
 
Next to the international airport of Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, lies the free trade zone 
(export processing zone) “Las Mercedes”. In December 2006, some 25,500 people worked 
there, 64% of which were women (especially young women). Most of the enterprises operating 
in this zone are of Asian capital, mainly Taiwanese, and they belong to the clothing sector (see 
Table 4). They are subcontractors, which assemble clothing items for North-American 
companies (retailers, such as Wal-Mart or JCPenney, and brand name marketers or 
manufacturers such as VF Jeans, Levi Strauss, Dickies, etc.). The near totality of their 
production goes to the US market. The free trade zone “Las Mercedes” is one of the many 
examples of what is called in the Caribbean Basin countries (Mexico, Central America and the 
Dominican Republic) the maquiladora industry3. 
 
                                                     
1 My thanks go to the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (the Spanish governmental 
cooperation agency) who financed the two stays in Nicaragua (1998 and 2007). I would also like to thank 
Elena Montobbio, Chepe Morales, and François Bonvin for their help, contacts and advices in Managua 
(Nicaragua). 
2 Cited in Meléndez (2002). 
3 The term maquila or maquiladora industry is used to refer to an export industry that assembles imported 
intermediate goods and that enjoys preferential fiscal and tariff treatment (the companies do not pay 
taxes, nor pay tariffs on the imported intermediate goods).  
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Are these zones really “zones of hope in the Nicaragua in the new era” as was written in a 
poster at the entrance of the offices of free trade zone “Las Mercedes”? Or, in other words, does 
the maquiladora industry really contribute to a sustainable (long-term) industrial development 
of Nicaragua?  
 
In 1998, during a first field research, we observed that the enterprises of the free trade zone “Las 
Mercedes” formed an enclave. Everything came from the exterior: the material inputs (fabric, 
thread, buttons, zippers, etc.) were all imported and the enterprises’ managers were expatriates. 
The enterprises employed Nicaraguan workers mainly to carry out manual and routine tasks on 
the production line. Furthermore, these enterprises were footloose; they could easily abandon 
Nicaragua to settle in another country (van Wunnik, 2001). 
 
One argument used then by the defenders of the free trade zones was that the Nicaraguan export 
industry was still in its first (infant) phase. Gradually, it would, like the Asian emerging 
economies, upgrade. In other words, progressively, these enterprises would become more 
embedded in the territory (developing links with local suppliers, employing local managers, 
etc.) and would carry out activities that are more complex. 
 
To verify the existence of this “upgrading hope”, we realised a new field research in March 
2007. We decided to focus our study on the evolution of a Taiwanese maquiladora enterprise – 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. – that manufactures jeans and tweed trousers in Nicaragua for its North-
American customers (Levi Strauss, VF Jeans, Tommy Hilfiger Jeans, Wal-Mart, JC Penney, 
etc.). In 1998, it had three plants in Nicaragua and, in 2007, it had seven (employing a total of 
16.200 workers). It is the biggest maquiladora enterprise in Nicaragua and three of its plants 
(the three plants it possessed already in 1998) are in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes”. 
 
We have divided our paper into two parts. The first one is a descriptive part. We present Nien 
Hsing Textile Co. and the environment in which it operates: the socio-economic context of 
Nicaragua, the export-oriented industrial policy followed by the Nicaraguan governments with 
the free trade zones regime, the textile-clothing industry, the past and present international trade 
agreements that affect the clothing industry in the Caribbean Basin and Nicaragua, etc. 
 
In the second part, basing us on the case study of Nien Hsing Textile Co., we express our doubts 
about the contribution of this type of export assembly industry to the long-term industrial 
development of Nicaragua. It is an industry that has all the characteristics of an economic 
enclave and its permanence in Nicaragua is uncertain as it depends, in large part, on specific 
trade policy advantages enjoyed by Nicaragua. 
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PART I: DESCRIPTION 
 
In this descriptive part, we present, in the first section, the economic context of Nicaragua. In 
the second section, we explain the working of the free trade zones regime in Nicaragua and the 
arguments used to defend the implantation of such a regime. In the third section, we present the 
free trade zone “Las Mercedes”. In the fourth section, we describe the (generic) maquiladora 
enterprise of the textile-clothing sector (the textile-clothing value chain and the two 
subcontracting modalities offered to the customer). In the fifth section, w present the Taiwanese 
maquiladora subsidiary Nien Hsing Textile Co. Finally, in the sixth section, we explain the US 
trade policy towards Nicaragua; it is the main reason why Asian firms are assembling clothes in 
Nicaragua for the US market. 
     
1. The Nicaraguan economy  
 
Nicaragua is a Central American country of some 5.75 million inhabitants (as of 2005) (see 
Figure 1). Its demographic growth is high (between 2.6% and 3% annually between 1995 and 
2005). The economic situation of the country is difficult: with a GDP per capita of US$850 in 
2005, it is one of the poorest countries in Latin America4 (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2007). 
The situation on the job market is also bad. The economy does not create enough jobs to absorb 
the many people who arrive year after year on the labour market. It would have to create some 
100,000 jobs per year to prevent the labour market situation to worsen5. For example, in 
Managua – the capital – around 41% of the economically active population was either 
unemployed or underemployed in 20056. All these factors must explain the important 
emigration experienced by Nicaragua. About 10% of the Nicaraguans reside permanently in 
another country, mainly in the United States and in Costa Rica (Baumeister, 2006). 
 
As for its interactions with the outside world, Nicaragua is faced with significant imbalances on 
its trade balance and its current account. In 2005, its merchandises imports represented, in value, 
almost two times its merchandises exports. The remittances sent by the emigrants partially 
rebalance its current account. Nevertheless, its current account deficit represented, in 2004, 
15.5% of its GDP (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2007). Nicaragua is heavily indebted to other 
countries. However, it has been able, thanks to agreements with multilateral institutions and 
certain creditor countries, to reduce significantly its foreign debt over the course of the last 
years7. 
 
Finally, referring to the manufacturing industry, Nicaraguan manufacturing is poorly developed: 
it has difficulties competing with foreign enterprises, including the Central Americans, in both 
price and quality of the product. In addition, it depends largely on the import of intermediary 
inputs and capital goods. The stock of capital goods is old, the domestic entrepreneurs do not 
invest in the domestic manufacturing industry, and bank credits are scarce and expensive. In 
addition, the industry has grapple with other important constraints such as a clear deficit of 
                                                     
4 Due to its recent turbulent history (the Sandinista revolution at the end of the 1970’s, the war against the 
Contras, the socialization of the economy, the capital flight and the hyper-inflation in the 1980’s, the 
disapearance of the cotton activity, the difficult transition from a socialist to a market economy at the start 
of the 1990’s, etc.), Nicaragua’s real GDP in 1999 was 18% lower than it was in 1977 (CADIN, 2001). 
5 Interview with Roser Solà Montserrat. (At the end of the article, the reader will find the list of the 
persons interviewed during our field research in Nicaragua.) 
6 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo (INEC) cited in PEMCE (2006). 
7 Nicaragua is member of the HIPC, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. This is an initiative launched by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which aims to assist the least developed highly 
indebted countries by reducing their external debt repayments to sustainable levels. 
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infrastructures (roads, ports, etc.), costly electricity subject to power cuts and voltage drops, and 
public sector bureaucracy (Amaya, 1998; CADIN, 2001; PEMCE, 2006; World Bank, 2004). 
 
Figure 1: Nicaragua in the Caribbean Basin 
 
 
2. The free trade zones regime in Nicaragua  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, after the Sandinistas abandoned power, the Nicaraguan 
governing authorities have used the “industrial export free trade zones” (zonas francas 
industriales de exportación) to attract foreign manufacturing investment in the hope that these 
would create jobs and act as a catalyst for the industrialization of the country. In the framework 
of the free trade zone regime, the investor (maquiladora enterprise) benefits from buildings for 
rent in a guarded industrial zone, complete tax and customs duties exemption on its activity and 
the right to repatriate its profits and capital freely (see Table 1 for an explanation of the two 
actors in the free trade zone regime: the free trade zone (empresa operadora) and the 
maquiladora enterprise (empresa usuaria)). All the Central American countries offer these 
types of advantages in the framework of their respective free trade zones. 
 
Over the course of the last decade, the activity of the (maquiladora) enterprises operating under 
the free trade zones regime in Nicaragua has experienced an important expansion. In 1998, these 
enterprises employed some 18 0000 workers. In December 2006, the number of employees of 
these enterprises was of the order of 80.000 workers. The activity continued to be, just as in 
1998, essentially that of the manufacture of clothing (in 2006, the clothing industry employed 
more than 85% of the employees of all the enterprises in the free trade zones). In 2006, exports 
by companies in the free zones (US$680 million) represented 44% of the total exports of 
Nicaragua. In 2005, local added value, i.e. exports of assembled goods minus imports of 
intermediary goods, generated by the enterprises of the free trade zones (US$210 million) 
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represented around a quarter of the gross added value of the country’s manufacturing industry8. 
The local added value generated by this industry in the totality of the five countries of Central 
America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) plus the Dominican 
Republic  (the DR-CAFTA zone) was, in 2005, around US$2.5 billion (see Table 2). In the 
majority of these countries, with the exception of Costa Rica (electronics), the main export 
product is clothing for the US market (CEPAL, 2007). 
 
Table 1: The two types of enterprises in the Nicaraguan free trade zone regime: the free trade 
zone and the maquiladora enterprise. 
The free trade zone 
(empresa operadora) 
The maquiladora enterprise 
(empresa usuaria) 
– Runs the free trade zone. 
– Is the owner of the land, the buildings, and the 
equipment of the free trade zone. 
– Rents these facilities to the maquiladora 
enterprises (empresas usuarias), including 
maintenance services and security.  
– Benefits from tax advantages, such as the 
exemption from payment of the corporation 
tax. 
– The free trade zone can be private or public 
(such as the free trade zone “Las Mercedes”). 
 
– Rents the buildings from the free trade zone 
(empresa operadora)(a). 
– Carries out the assembly of imported products. 
– Is the owner of the machines and the other 
equipment needed for production (sewing 
machines, washing machines, etc.).  
– Can freely repatriate both its capital and the 
profits generated. 
– Benefits from tax advantages, as may be the 
exemption from payment of the corporation 
tax(b) as well as from tariffs on imports of 
intermediary goods, raw materials, machines, 
etc.  
– Cannot sell the final products (assembled in 
Nicaragua) on the domestic market.  
Notes: (a) In September 1998, the monthly rent in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” was US $3.3 per 
m2 of industrial roof (m2 of building). According to the National Commission on the Free 
Trade Zones, in 2008, rents ranges between US$3,5 and US$4 per m2 of industrial roof.   
 (b) The rate of the corporation tax in Nicaragua is in 2008, and was in 1998, 30% of the profits.  
 
Table 2: The maquiladora industry or IMANE (Industria Manufacturera de Exportación – 
Export Manufacturing Industry) in the DR-CAFTA zone (2006). 
Country Employment Exports  (US$ millions) 
Share of exports 
in total 
merchandises 
exports   
(%) 
Gross value 
added  
(US$ millions) 
Share in GDP  
(%) 
Costa Rica 43.060 4.741,30 57,8 1100,2* 5,5* 
El Salvador 79.868 1.602,00 45,6 381,40 2,1 
Guatemala 144.361 2.601,10 43,2 463 1,3 
Honduras 130.145 2.845,60 59,6 596,6 6,5 
Nicaragua 80.515 931,9 47,1 250 4,7 
Dominican Rep. 148.411 4.553,7 70 ... 2,3* 
DR-CAFTA 626.360 17.275,6 55,9 ... ... 
Note: * 2005 
Source: CEPAL (2007). 
 
                                                     
8 Data from the Banco Central de Nicaragua (2007) and the Comisión Nacional de las Zonas Francas (a 
public-sector organization that manages the free trade zone regimes).  
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The World Trade Organization wants to ban the free trade zones (export processing zones) 
regimes, because it considers that these zones offer a preferential trade treatment to export 
enterprises. In other words, the fiscal free trade zones benefits are considered a form of export 
subsidy. However, it seems that Nicaragua, being a poor country with a GDP per capita below 
US$1.000, may, in contrast to the majority of the other countries of the Caribbean Basin, 
maintain its free trade zones regime after 2008 until 2015 (Sánchez y Vos, 2006; WTO, 2007).  
 
3. The free trade zone “Las Mercedes” (June 1998 vs. December 2006) 
 
In June 1998, the 15 establishments of the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” employed around 
14,000 workers (essentially young women). The vast majority of these establishments belonged 
to the clothing industry (13 establishments) and were of foreign capital (Asia, United States and 
Italian) (14 establishments) (see Table 3). The clothing industry establishments were 
subcontractors, which carried out the assembly of clothing for US customers. 
 
Eight and a half years later, the main activity of the establishments of the free trade zone 
remains unchanged: they are still essentially subcontracted enterprises of the clothing industry. 
Nor has the origin of these enterprises changed: they are still foreign capital enterprises. The 
number of workers of the establishments of the zone has increased significantly: it has risen to 
approximately 25.500 workers (see Table 4). 
 
Compared to 1998, six establishments left the zone (Confenic, Cupid, Ecconic, Hope, Jem III, 
Mil Colours, Nicseda). Ecconic and Mil Colores went to another free trade zone in Nicaragua. 
Two establishments changed their name: Chentex is now called Henry Garments and Ronaco 
DyM9. Seven new establishments established in the zone.  
 
 
                                                     
9 It seems that the maquiladora enterprises have the tendency to change the name of their enterprise after 
10 years of presence in Nicaragua so as to be able to continue to benefit from the 100% corporate tax 
exemption. The law governing the free trade zones authorizes a 100% exemption only over the course of 
the first ten years of operation of the enterprise, starting as of the eleventh year it becomes a 60% 
exemption. 
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Table 3: Establishments in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” in June 1998.   
Jobs (Jun-98) Establishment Capital 
nationality 
Activity Manufactured items 
number % 
Industrial roof 
(m2)  (jun-98) 
Costumers Installation 
date 
Confenic Nicaragua Clothing Women’s underwear 200 1,42% 2.423 Sara Lee Knits Dec-94 
Cupido Korea Handcraft Artificial flowers 45 0,32% 370  Jun-94 
Chentex Taiwan Clothing Jeans (pants, shorts) 1.715 12,15% 13.301 Bugle Boy Jun-95 
Chih Hsing Taiwan Clothing Trousers, shorts 2.211 15,66% 20.130  May-97 
China United Taiwan Clothing Tee-shirts, Shirts 1.310 9,28% 11.173 Tommy Hilfiger, Perry Ellis Jan-96 
Ecconic Italy Footwear Footwear 234 1,66% 3.600  Jan-92 
Esperanza Korea Clothing Tee-shirts 476 3,37% 2.438  Apr-97 
Fortex Taiwan Clothing Pants, shorts, shirts 1.551 10,99% 7.200 JC Penney, Kmart,  Montgomery Ward Aug-92 
Istmo Korea Clothing Shirts, trousers 1.255 8,89% 9.276 Sears Roebuck, Casual corner, JC Penney, etc. Nov-93 
Jem III USA Clothing Shirts, chaquetas 365 2,59% 3.630  Dec-97 
Metro Garments Hong Kong Clothing Knit-shirts (Tee-shirts) 549 3,89% 3.640  Aug-95 
Mil Colores USA Clothing Trousers, shirts 838 5,94% 4.800  Aug-97 
Nicseda Korea Clothing Knit-polo, T-shirts, Turtleneck shirts  0,00% 2.454 Eskay&Co., Gabtee Inc. Nov-93 
Nien Hsing Taiwan Clothing Jeans (pants, shorts) 1.687 11,95% 12.511 Bugle Boy, Lee Cooper, Río, Bill Blas, C&Y, etc. Mar-94 
Rocedes USA Clothing Jeans (pants, shorts) 1.313 9,30% 6.597 Montgomery Ward, Wal-Mart, JC Penney, etc. Jul-93 
Ronaco USA Clothing Pants, shorts, shirts 369 2,61% 1.600 Eddy Haggar, Ocean Pacific,Lee Thomas Inc. Nov-91 
     14.118 100% 105.143   
Sources: Corporación de las Zonas Francas, Gerencia Normativa & Control (1998) and Marschall (1998) 
 
Table 4: Establishments in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” in December 2006. 
Employed workers (Dec-06) Establishment Capital nationality Activity 
Approbation 
date 
Date 
beginning of 
operations  Men Women TOTAL % 
Industrial 
roof m²      
(Dec-06) 
Henry Garments, S.A.  Taiwan Clothing 5-Apr-02 1-Jul-05 1.022 1.845 2.867 11,25% 16.932 
Chih Hsing Garments  Taiwan Clothing 25-Feb-97 1-may-97 821 1.963 2.784 10,93% 16.767 
China United Internacional Taiwan Clothing 28-Nov-05 28-Nov-05 420 1.372 1.792 7,03% 21.528 
China Unique Garments MFG Taiwan Clothing 1-Jan-02 1-Aug-02 263 608 871 3,42% 9.415 
Formosa Textil, S.A.  Taiwan Clothing 6-may-98 16-mar-99 245 1.387 1.632 6,41% 17.024 
Fortex Industrial Nic., S.A. Taiwan Clothing 1-Aug-92 1-Aug-92 230 646 876 3,44% 10.114 
Hansae Nicaragua, S.A. Korea Clothing 16-Dec-99 1-Jan-00 1.786 2.358 4.144 16,27% 27.758 
Istmo textil Nicaragua S, A Korea Clothing 24-Feb-05 24-Feb-05 1.347 1.731 3.078 12,08% 25.445 
Metro Garments, S.A. Hong Kong Clothing 1-Jun-95 17-Aug-95 442 305 747 2,93% 8.611 
Nien Hsing Garments, S.A. Taiwan Clothing 22-Dec-03 22-Dec-03 633 2.409 3.042 11,94% 12.511 
Ropa de las Mercedes, S.A. (Rocedes) U.S.A Clothing 9-Feb-93 13-Jul-93 1.393 663 2.056 8,07% 14.037 
Maquiladora D & M, S.A. El Salvador Clothing 1-Nov-91 1-Nov-91 272 215 487 1,91% 2.200 
Sinonica Industrial, S.A. Taiwan Clothing 24-Aug-00 1-sep-00 348 721 1.069 4,20% 7.998 
Sun Star Nicaragua S.A. Korea Spare parts 15-Oct-04 30-Nov-05 2 1 3 0,01% 360 
Command Medical Nicaragua S.A.  U.S.A Medical acc. 24-Feb-05 15-Oct-05 3 8 11 0,04% 818 
Finotex S.A. Honduras Labels 22-Aug-05 15-Oct-05 2 0 2 0,01% 100 
Rocedes Apparel, S.A. U.S.A Clothing 29-Jun-00 18-Aug-00 14 0 14 0,05% 0 
Nassa U.S.A Clothing 15-Oct-04 15-Oct-04 0 0 0 0,00% 0 
Sinai El Salvador Spare parts 11-Oct-05 30-Nov-05 2 1 3 0,01% 30 
Dasoltex S.A. Korea Clothing 21-Dec-06 21-Dec-06     3.642 
Bun-Ter Company S.A. Hong Kong Clothing 21-Dec-06 21-Dec-06     4.404 
     9.245 16.233 25.478 100% 199.693 
Source: Comisión Nacional de las Zonas Francas. 
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4. The maquiladora enterprise 
 
In this section, we focus on the description of the (generic) maquiladora enterprise of the 
clothing industry. Firstly, we present some characteristics of the activity undertaken by this 
enterprise: the assembly of clothing. Secondly, we explain the two subcontracting modalities 
offered by these maquiladora enterprises to their customers.  
 
4.1. The assembly of clothing in the textile-clothing value chain 
 
We can distinguish three segments in the textile-clothing value chain: the fabrication of the 
thread and fabric, the assembly of the garment and the distribution (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The textile-clothing value chain 
Cotton,
wool,etc.
Natural 
fibers
Wood, petrol, natural gas
Synthetic 
fibers
Chemical plants & petrochemical
refineries
SYNTHETIC FIBERS 
PRODUCTION
(acrylic, polyester, nylon, etc.)
TEXTILE INDUSTRY
FABRIC 
MANUFACTURE
Weaving/knitting, 
dyeing, finishing
CLOTHING / 
APPAREL 
INDUSTRY
ASSEMBLY OF THE 
GARMENT
Designing, cutting,
sewing, ironing, 
inspecting, packing.
TWO TYPES OF 
GARMENTS
•Basic/standardized 
garment
•Fashion/differentiated 
garment
DISTRIBUTION
Retailers,  branded 
marketers, branded 
manufacturers.  
INDUSTRIAL GOODS
(upholstery and car carpets, etc.)
HOUSEHOLD GOODS
(carpets, curtains, etc.)
SPINNING
 
Source: Based on Dicken (1998). 
 
The segment of garment assembly consists mainly of the sewing of different pieces of fabric or 
other material (leather, plastic) to obtain the finished garment. This segment is labour intensive10 
and employs low skilled workers that can be quickly trained for the job. In addition, this 
segment can be geographically separated from the other segments of the value chain. That is 
why the low labour costs are one of the fundamental localization determinants of the clothing 
industry. The technology used is simple and does not require large capital investments. It is a 
segment where barriers to entry are low. Accordingly, virtually any country, even with a low 
development level, can carry out this activity.  
 
                                                     
10 As D. Green (1998: 7) writes: “Clothing production has resisted automation more than many other 
industries, as machines have so far failed to match the human hand in manipulating cloth during the 
sewing stage.”  
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On the contrary, textile production (spinning and weaving) is far more capital intensive and the 
management of its production process is more complex. It also requires a production location 
where infrastructure and basic services (electricity, water) are developed (Gereffi, 1994; ILO, 
1997; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003; Dicken, 2007: Abernathy et al., 2005).  
 
Two general garment types can be distinguished according to the rate of product turnover 
(Dicken, 2007; OIT, 1997; Dimitrakou, 2007; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003):  
 
– The basic or standardised garments: They are garments that are kept in the collections for 
many years, such as the classic black pants or simple jeans. Their style is basic and constant, 
without changes from season to season. Its assembly is simple, they are produced in large 
series, and competition on the market is mainly based on prices. Examples of such garments 
are men’s dress shirts or pants, underwear, blue jeans, jogging suits, etc. 
 
– The fashion or differentiated garments: They are garments with a shorter product cycle (less 
than 20 weeks), which require a short lead-time of the manufacturers. They are 
characterized by being very seasonal and with a constantly changing style. It is difficult to 
make accurate demand predictions since their demand tends to be very volatile. 
Furthermore, in the higher range, the garments are more complex to assemble. 
 
In the geographical location of the clothing industry, the type of garment that is manufactured 
plays an important role. For the basic or standardized garments, production locations have to 
offer two types of advantages: low labour costs and trade barriers (of the United States and the 
European Union) avoidance. For the fashion or differentiated garments, additional location 
determinants are looked after: the proximity to the market and, for the higher range garments, 
the ability to manufacture a sophisticated product (Dicken, 2007; OIT, 1997; Gereffi and 
Memedovic, 2003; Gereffi, 1994).  
 
Figure 3 shows the main exporting countries of clothing to the United States in 2006. The 
weight of the Caribbean Basin countries is relatively important. Why? Chiefly, because these 
countries benefit from preferential trade agreements with the United States (see section 6). 
Within the Caribbean Basin, the largest exporters of clothing are Honduras, Guatemala, and the 
Dominican Republic (see Figure 4). 
 
The last segment of the textile-clothing value chain is the distribution of the finished garment. 
Here we find brand name enterprises (Tommy Hilfiger, Nike, Levi Strauss, VF Jeans, etc.) or 
retailers (Wal-Mart, JC Penney, The Gap, etc.). This segment is highly concentrated because 
high barriers to entry exist. The access to the final customers market is hard because the 
enterprise needs to possess a network of department stores or a recognized brand name.  
 
Because of the uneven existence of barriers to entry along the different segments of the textile-
clothing value chain, market power on the market of the garment assembly service (where 
subcontractors (maquiladora enterprises) and retailers or brand name enterprises meet) is on the 
side of the buyer.  
 10
 
Figure 3: The leading exporters of clothing to the United States (by value) (2006) 
China 
28%
Caribean Bassin (DR-
CAFTA & Haiti)
11%
Mexico 
7%Indonesia 
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Figure 4: Main clothing exporters to the United States from the Caribbean Basin (by value) 
(2006) (100% represents the total clothing exports from Central America, Dominican 
Republic and Haiti to the United States) 
Dominican Republic 
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Nicaragua 
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Source: International trade statistics 2007, Merchandise trade by product, World Trade Organisation  
{http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_merch_trade_product_e.htm}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
4.2. The two subcontracting modalities: CMT and full-package 
 
The maquiladora enterprises can offer two types of subcontracting to its customer: CMT (Cut, 
Make and Trim) and full-package. 
 
In the first modality (CMT), the customer sends all the intermediary inputs (fabric, buttons, 
zippers, thread, etc.) to the maquiladora enterprise, and the latter limits itself to the assembly of 
the garment according to the design given by the customer: cut the fabric (according to the 
pattern sent by the customer), sew and trim. Once finished, the garment is re-exported to the 
customer. In this modality, the maquiladora enterprise only brings the manpower and the 
machinery needed for assembly. Rocedes, one US enterprise in the free trade zone “Las 
Mercedes”, offers this subcontracting modality to its customers (the most important one is 
Dickies) (see Figure 5). 
 
In the second modality (full-package), the maquiladora enterprise carries out the whole 
production process of its customer’s garment. It receives the design from the customer, it 
manufactures or buys to third parties the necessary intermediary inputs (fabric, buttons, zippers, 
thread, etc.), it cuts the fabric, sews the garment, packages it, and exports it to the customer 
(Gereffi, 1999; PEMCE, 2006). Nien Hsing Textile Co., as the other enterprises of Asian capital 
in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes”, offers this full-package service to its customers (see 
Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: The two subcontracting modalities: CMT and full-package  
Modality 1: CMT 
 
Modality 2: Full-package 
 
Offshore 
apparel 
manufacturer
The US customer sents the 
majority of the intermediary 
inputs (fabric, zippers, buttons, 
trimmings, etc.) to the offshore 
producer.
Reexport of the 
finished garments.
Cut, Make & Trim
USA
Nicaragua
Branded 
manufacturer
 
Asian subcontractor 
plant
Export of the “Made in 
Nicaragua” finished 
garments to the customer 
in the USA.  
Asian 
subcontractor
Cutting, sewing, inspecting, 
pressing, packaging
Retailer / Branded 
manufacturer / 
Branded marketer
Taiwan
USA
Nicaragua
Full-package contract
The Asian producer sents the 
majority of the intermediary 
inputs (uncutted fabric, zips, 
buttons, trimmings, etc.) to its 
plant in Nicaragua.
 
 
The maquiladora enterprises in Nicaragua offer the assembly or manufacture of standardized or 
basic garments. Customers’ orders are executed in large batches. Competition between the 
subcontractors is fierce and is based essentially on price: there are large numbers of suppliers 
and few buyers of this clothing manufacture service11. As G. Wong12 (former executive 
secretary of the Corporación de las Zonas Francas) noted: “(usually) the customer comes with 
a previously established price and if you don’t accept it, as a subcontractor, he tells you that he 
has another subcontractor in Honduras that would gladly accept its offer.” 
 
Consequently, the profit margin made by the maquiladora enterprises is small. Profits are made 
on sales volume. This renders the maquiladora enterprise vulnerable to small variations in 
                                                     
11 According to the Nien Hsing Textile Co. spokewoman (interview), there are some 300 suppliers in the 
world that offer the assembly of jeans garments.  
12 Interview. 
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labour costs, intermediary inputs and raw materials costs, and in the price of the subcontracting 
service offered13. 
 
This fierce competition, the suppression of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (see section 6) and the 
entry of ever more (poor) countries into the clothing industry (Cambodia, Haiti, etc.) cause 
prices to fall (see Table 5). For example, according to the spokeswoman of a maquiladora 
enterprise (Nien Hsing Textile Co.), in 1998, the price of one pair of trousers (jeans or tweed), 
in the full-package modality, hovered around US$8-9 (see Table 6). In 2007, this price had 
decreased to of US$6-7 per pair. The same happened to the CMT price, according to a North-
American enterprise (Rocedes), it also lowered over the last 10 years and was, in 2007, US$1,5 
per pair of trousers assembled14. 
 
Table 5: Unit price of apparel exports to the US Market 1992-2007(a) 
Country 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 % change 92 - 07 
% change 
98 - 07 
World 3,77 3,73 3,77 3,74 3,57 3,30 3,25 3,18 3,17 -16,06% -15,27% 
China 3,59 3,84 4,37 4,74 4,84 3,57 3,00 2,85 2,83 -21,24% -40,23% 
Honduras 3,11 3,02 2,32 2,34 2,26 2,24 2,23 2,15 2,05 -34,00% -12,40% 
Mexico 3,38 3,31 3,24 3,27 3,33 3,44 3,53 3,59 3,74 10,61% 14,21% 
Indonesia 3,64 3,65 4,02 3,82 3,94 3,43 3,42 3,62 3,74 2,71% -2,18% 
Cambodia 1,32 5,06 0,99 3,44 3,19 2,37 2,25 2,53 2,80 111,97% -18,60% 
El Salvador 2,78 2,46 2,51 2,43 2,20 2,16 2,02 1,95 1,83 -34,05% -24,36% 
Guatemala 3,52 3,68 3,92 4,05 4,13 3,99 3,90 3,92 3,86 9,71% -4,76% 
Dominican Republic 2,87 2,88 2,68 2,82 2,90 2,96 2,70 2,65 2,76 -3,77% -1,86% 
Nicaragua 3,85 3,47 3,82 4,16 4,06 3,60 3,39 3,49 3,39 -11,78% -18,41% 
Haiti 1,73 1,78 1,74 1,93 2,01 1,99 2,11 1,79 1,83 5,80% -5,03% 
Notes:  (a) Dollar value of apparel imports divided by square meters equivalent of apparel imports.  
Source: Value and volume imports data from the Office of Textiles and Apparel Major Shippers Report 
{http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msrpoint.htm}. 
 
Table 6: Cost structure of a single pair of men’s jeans assembled in Nicaragua (around year 
2000-2001) (in US$) 
Total fabric cost $ 4,23 
Trim cost (incl. pocketing, thread) $ 1,10 
Labour Cost (Cut, Make, Finish) $ 2,17 
Profit per garment $ 0,75 
  FOB Cost $ 8,25 
  Shipping cost per garment $ 0,07 
  Total manufacturing & Shipping $ 8,32 
Source: O’Rourke Group 2002 cited in Abernathy et al. (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 According to the manager of a maquiladora enterprise offering the CMT service (interview), a 
difference superior to 10 US cents in production costs will occasion the relocation of production. 
14 The cost structure of a full-package jeans is approximately 50% fabric, 25% assembly and 25% the rest 
(trim cost, transport, depreciation, profit margin, etc.). 
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5. Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua 
 
In this section, we present the corporation Nien Hsing Textile Co., the plants this corporation 
possesses in Nicaragua and one of its plants (Chih Hsing). 
5.1. Nien Hsing Textile Co. group 
 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. carries out the production of denim fabric and the manufacture of jean 
and tweed trousers. It offers to its clients the “full-package” subcontracting modality. According 
to the company’s brochure, in 2006, it was the largest “full-package” jeans manufacturer and the 
sixth largest denim fabric manufacturer in the world. The company has among its clients Levi 
Strauss, VF Jeans (Lee, Wrangler), Tommy Hilfiger Jeans, Wal-Mart and JC Penney. Outside 
Taiwan, the company possesses, apart from its plants in Nicaragua, plants in Mexico and in 
Lesotho15 (see Table 7). On a world scale, Nien Hsing Textile Co. had, in 2007, more than 
60.000 employees. 
 
Table 7: Nien Hsing Textile Co. in the world (2004) 
Production Area Locations Capacity 
Miao Li H.Q. and Hou Long 
Denim Mill About 2.6 million yards per month. 
Taipei Office   Taiwan 
Patterning and Developing 
Center    
Garment Factories-Jeans Three factories with about 1.5 million dozens per year altogether. 
Garment Factories-Casual wears Two factories with about 800 thousand dozens per year altogether. 
Nicaragua 
Dyeing Mill Fully Automated facility with about 36 millions yards per year. 
Garment Factories Three garment factories. 
Denim Mill  About 13 million yards per year. Lesotho 
Ring Spinning Mill About 35,000 rings yarn. 
Denim Mill  About 26 millions yards per year. 
Mexico 
Garment Factories  About 0.4 million dozens per year. 
Source: Nien Hsing Textile Co. Ltd. {http://www.nht.com.tw}. 
 
The production of jeans (High Sierra Jeans) for a North American chain of stores, in March 
2007, permits us to illustrate the full-package subcontracting offered by Nien Hsing Textile Co. 
The jeans were sold to the client at US$6 per pair (who then sold them to the North American 
end-consumer, at least according to the label that the trousers carried, for US$28 per pair). Nien 
Hsing Textile Co. produced the denim fabric in its Taiwanese factory. It sent the fabric by boat 
to Nicaragua to undertake manufacture of the jeans (cutting of the fabric, sewing, washing, 
drying, buttoning, ironing, labelling and packaging) in one of its plants in Nicaragua (Chih 
Hsing). This plant received the garment design via email and the pattern was simply printed out 
on a big printer. Once printed, it was cut out and sent to the fabric-cutting division where the 
manufacturing process commenced. Once produced, the jeans were sent by lorry to Puerto 
                                                     
15 Lesotho, just like Nicaragua, has preferential access (without customs duties) to the US market for 
apparel items (manufactured with Asian fabric) to which it exports 85% of its production. One finds there 
also, just as in Nicaragua, a significant concentration of Taiwanese companies (The Economist, 2007). 
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Cortés (an Honduran port on the Caribbean Sea) to be loaded onto a ship to the United States 
(Miami, Houston) (see Figure 1)16. 
 
5.2. Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua 
 
In 1998, Nien Hsing Textile Co. possessed three establishments dedicated to the assembly of 
trousers in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes”. These plants employed, in total, some 5.600 
workers (40% of workers of all the workers in the zone) (see Table 8). 
 
In 2007, the presence of Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua had increased significantly: to the 
three plants of the “Las Mercedes” zone, had been added four new plants in other free trade 
zones (two garment factories, one card board manufacturer factory, and one dyeing mill). These 
plants employed, in total, some 16.000 workers (see Table 9). 
 
Table 8: Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua (June 1998) 
 Chentex Chih Hsing Nien Hsing 
Products Pants, shorts Pants, shorts Pants, shorts 
Jobs  
(June 1998) 1.715 2.211 1.687 
Date of setting-up 1995 1997 1994 
Sources: Corporación de las Zonas Francas and  Marschall (1998). 
 
Table 9: Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua (December 2006) 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. plants in the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” 
 Henry Garments(a) Chih Hsing Nien Hsing 
Products Pants, shorts Pants, shorts Pants, shorts 
Jobs (December 2006) 2.867 2.784 3.042 
Date of setting-up 2005 1997 2003 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. plants outside the free trade zone “Las Mercedes” 
 Chao Hsing John Garments 
Cartonera 
industrial Alpha Textil 
Products Pants, shorts Pants, shorts Cardboard boxes 
Dyeing and 
stamping of 
the fabric 
Jobs (December 2006) 3 412 3 856 97 238 
Date of setting-up 1999 2001 2002 2002 
Note: (a) Chentex changed its name for Henry Garments, but it is the same factory. 
Source: Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas. 
 
5.3. Chih Hsing in 2007  
 
In 2007, the Chih Hsing plant belonging to Nien Hsing Textile Co. had some 3.000 employees 
and its daily output was around 23.000 to 26.000 pairs of jeans (trousers or shorts). The 
management posts in production (plant production manager, division managers, line managers 
                                                     
16 It takes about one day’s journey by road from Managua to Puerto Cortés. Three days are then necessary 
for sea transport of the merchandise to the port of Miami (information obtained on the Web site of 
Rocedes S.A. (http://www.rocedes.com.ni)). 
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(jefes de línea)) were occupied by expatriates (Taiwanese and mainland Chinese17). The director 
of the plant is Taiwanese and, in the rest of the administration (accounting, human resources 
management, and export), there are around thirty employees, half of which are expatriates. 
 
The jobs created (for the Nicaraguan employees) are manual, segmented, and monotonous jobs, 
that do not require previous qualifications (shop floor worker and supervisor). Each worker is 
assigned a specific and simple task (cutting the fabric, sewing the lateral seam of the trousers, 
sewing the pocket of the trousers, sewing zippers, putting buttons, ironing, carrying out the final 
inspection, etc.) (see Figure 6). Work conditions are hard: long work days (often 10-12 hours 
per day), fast work pace, heat, noise, risks incurred during fabric cutting18 or during buttoning, 
exposure to plush or to chemical substances (significant incidence of respiratory and allergy-
related illnesses), etc. (see Lara, 2002; MEC, 2003). 
 
Labour turnover is very high: in January 2007, 10% of the employees of Chih Hsing were 
replaced. This is a generalized phenomenon within the Nicaraguan maquiladora industry. Such 
large turnover of the workforce is possible thanks to the job characteristics (simple, manual job) 
as well as to the low costs associated with layoffs (see MEC, 2003). Given that the workers 
continually change plants, the new employee of the plant generally has already a prior 
experience and needs no initial training. 
 
The same situation concerning the job characteristics seems to exist in the other Nicaraguan 
plants owned by Nien Hsing Textile Co. 
 
The material inputs (fabric, buttons, zippers, thread, etc.) used by Chih Hsing and the other four 
Nien Hsing plants that assemble trousers in Nicaragua, are, with the exception of the pumice 
stone19 and the cardboard boxes, all imported. The cardboard boxes are manufactured by Nien 
Hsing in its plant Cartonera Industrial. There is no process subcontracting (sewing, washing, 
ironing or packaging) done by local enterprises or family workshops. On occasion “sub-
subcontracting” of one part of an order to another maquiladora enterprise occurs when Nien 
Hsing Textile Co. has difficulties meeting the delivery delays fixed in the contract with the 
customer. 
                                                     
17 As the manager of one North American maquiladora enterprise remarked, this access to (mainland) 
Chinese personnel permits Tawainese companies to employ expatriate personnel at low wages to occupy 
middle-management and technician (machine repair and maintenance) posts. 
18 Fabric cutting is performed with manual electric saws. 
19 The pumice stone is a white volcanic stone that serves to discolour and “age” the jeans. It comes from a 
volcanic region of Nicaragua. 
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Figure 6: The assembly of a pair of jeans in Chih Hsing 
The pattern is sent via internet from the central office in Taiwan directly to the 
office in Chih Hsing Nicaragua, where 4 to 5 people work. This patterns is then 
printed with a plotter. Fabric cutting is done according to this pattern.    
FABRIC CUTTING
Mainly women
•The worker carries out the same task during the whole working day (sewing 
of the lateral seam, sewing of the hem, etc.)
•On each sewing machine (Brother or Singer) there is a red light: when it is 
switched on, it indicates that there is a problem with the machine and a 
technician comes.
GARMENT SEWING
Mixed
WASHING
Mainly men
During the drying pumice stone are added in the drying machines to “wear out” 
and “age” artificially the trousers or shorts. DRYING
Mainly men
BUTONNING 
The button is inserted by two workers. The first introduces the button in the 
machine. The second puts the garment underneath the machine and presses 
a pedal to insert it. 
Mainly women
Ironing is done with home-like irons.IRONING
Mainly men
Inspection to separate the trousers and shorts with a defect from the good 
ones. FINAL INSPECTION
Mainly women
PACKAGING
Worker puts the etiquette for the US consumer, that is, with the final price in 
US$. The trousers are than packed in cardboard boxes and loaded onto a 
lorry.Mainly men  
 
5.4. The unchanged nature of Nien Hsing Textile Co. (1998 – 2007) 
 
Nine years have not succeeded in changing significantly the nature of the maquiladora 
subsidiary Nien Hsing Textile Co. Just as in 1998 (see Marschall, 1998; van Wunnik, 2001; 
Amaya y Chavarría, 1996), everything continues to come from outside: the brand name, the 
design, the material inputs and the managers. The garments produced by Nien Hsing are still 
standard or basic articles subject to fierce price competition and that are delivered in large 
batches. The Nicaraguan employees continue to fill the same type of manual and routine jobs. 
The only small change is in the two plants owned by the Nien Hsing Textile Co.: Alpha Textil 
(dyeing and stamping of the fabric) and Cartonera Industrial (cardboard boxes). They indicate a 
certain enlargement of the activities beyond the simple manufacture of garments carried out by 
Nien Hsing Textile Co. in Nicaragua. 
 
6.  The main motivation for the installation of Nien Hsing Textile Co. 
in Nicaragua 
 
Just like the other Asian maquiladora enterprises, Nien Hsing Textile Co. is in Nicaragua, 
essentially, to circumvent North American trade barriers20. Labour costs – the most important 
                                                     
20 In all likelihood, the fact of being one of the few countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan must 
also go some way to explaining the significant concentration of Taiwanese clothing enterprises in 
Nicaragua. 
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production location determinant for basic or standardized garments – are generally lower in 
Asia (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Average monthly wages (US$) in the garment industry in some countries (2006) 
Country 
Average  
monthly wage 
(2006, US$) 
Cambodia 65 
China 120 
Vietnam 65 
Mexico 466 
Honduras 233 
Nicaragua 153 
Source: Data provided by Nien Hsing Textile Co21. 
 
In 1998, Nien Hsing Textile Co. was manufacturing in Nicaragua in order to evade the North 
American import quotas established in the framework of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement22 (OIT, 
1997). Contrary to numerous Asian countries (China, Vietnam, etc.), clothing coming from 
Nicaragua was not subject to import quotas by the United States. Nicaragua benefited, as did, in 
a lesser degree, the other countries of the Caribbean Basin (Central America and some 
Caribbean islands), from a preferential trade agreement with the United States23. 
 
In 2005, the quota exemption advantage that Nicaragua had: quotas on clothing articles were 
eliminated with the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. However, another international trade 
policy advantage was given to Nicaragua: the TPLs (Trade Preferential Levels). In the 
framework of the free trade agreement between the United States, Central America, and the 
Dominican Republic (the DR-CAFTA), Nicaragua is the only country of the six that may export 
a share of its clothing items to the United States without having to respect the rule of origin24. 
That is, a share of its clothing items may use Asian fabric (up to 100 million square metres per 
year) without having to pay tariffs on the value of this fabric when it enters the United States25. 
These TPLs will last 10 years and disappear in 2016 (PEMCE, 2006; Hernández, 2007; Sánchez 
y Vos, 2006). Another location advantage of Nicaragua is that, according to the World Trade 
Organisation agreements, it will be, as poorest country in the region (GDP per capita inferior 
than US$1.000), the only one that will be allowed to maintain its free trade zones regime after 
2008 (see section 4). 
 
These specific policy advantages possessed by Nicaragua must be the reason why it is the only 
country of the DR-CAFTA zone that saw its clothing exports to the US rise in 2005 and 2006 
after the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (CEPAL, 2007) (see Table 11). 
 
                                                     
21 According to the CEPAL (2007), the average monthly wage in the industrial free trade zones of 
Nicaragua was US$86 in 2006. 
22 The Multi-Fiber Arrangement was an international trade regulation of the clothing-textile industry. 
Until January 1, 2005, this arrangement authorized import countries of textile-clothing products to use 
quotas as a trade barrier. 
23 Nicaragua was the only country of the “Caribbean Basin Initiative” that was totally exempted from 
import quotas on its garment products. 
24 In fact, the DR-CAFTA is a collection of specific bilateral trade agreements (involving each country 
with the United States) and not, as the name seems to indicate, a customs union between the seven 
countries. The free trade agreement between the United States and Nicaragua entered into force in April 
2006. 
25 In the « full-package » version, the cost of the fabric represents around half of the production costs of a 
pair of trousers (PANTS) (including within production costs the transport costs which the , dans ces coûts 
de production, les coûts de transport que supporte l’entreprise maquiladora). 
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Table 11: Apparel exports to the United States in US$ millions (1998-2007): Nicaragua vs. DR-
CAFTA 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
DR-CAFTA 7.573,3 8.973,0 9.092,5 9.509,5 9.104,1 8.406,2 7.895,0 
Nicaragua 232,0 335,6 432,9 594,7 715,6 879,3 967,8 
% Nicaragua 3,06% 3,74% 4,76% 6,25% 7,86% 10,46% 12,26% 
Source: Value imports data from the Office of Textiles and Apparel Major Shippers Report 
{http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msrpoint.htm} 
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 PART II: SOME DOUBTS 
 
Can the maquiladora industry act as a catalyst for industrial development in Nicaragua? Are we, 
as P. Romer (1993: 564-565) asserts about the export processing zones in Mauritius, in the 
presence of free trade zone where foreign investors contribute to this development “not because 
of the financial resources that they (bring) to the (country), but rather because of the knowledge 
they possess”? 
 
In order to study this question, we analyse, for the maquiladora subsidiary Nien Hsing Textile 
Co., three specific (sub)questions: 
 
1/ The technology transfer from the subsidiary; 
2/ The mobility potential of the subsidiary’s manufacturing activities; 
3/ The upgrading of the subsidiary over time. 
 
We conclude this paper by confronting the two scenarios concerning the export-oriented 
industrialization of developing countries: the optimistic “industrial upgrading” scenario and the 
pessimistic “race to the bottom” scenario. 
 
1. An absence of technological transfer 
 
By technology, we refer to “any type of useful economic knowledge” (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997: 171). We can distinguish three possible technology transfer conduits from the foreign 
capital maquiladora enterprise to the Nicaraguan agents (see, among others, Saggi, 2000; 
Kokko et al., 1996; Perez, 1998): 
 
– Labour force rotation: the training received and the experience acquired by the subsidiary’s 
employees (both manual workers and managers) can be transmitted to the host economy 
when these change employer or set up their own enterprise (spin-offs)26. 
 
– Backward linkages: The supplier requirements of the subsidiary, in terms of product price, 
product quality and delivery time, can spur the local supplier on to a higher efficiency level. 
In addition, the presence of maquiladora subsidiaries in the host country can generate a new 
demand for goods and services (intermediate goods, capital goods, services to enterprises) in 
the host economy. This may “push” total demand for some goods and services beyond a 
critical threshold, which will enable their production to be profitable in this economy27. 
 
– The demonstration effects: The arrival of foreign enterprises can inject new ideas – from the 
outside – to local company directors and other local managers. These can launch the same 
kind of businesses; can imitate certain aspects of the production organization of the foreign 
plant, etc. 
 
                                                     
26 Two kinds of skills can be distinguished: technical skills and managerial skills. Managerial skills are 
generally less specific to one particular field of production than technical skills. The first can thus be used 
more easily in other contexts. This renders them more easily “appropriable” by the host economy 
(Blomström and Kokko, 1997).  
27 As R. Caves (1996: 232) has written: “(...) many cells in the input-output table of a developing country 
are empty (...). Encourages by a specific demand for an output (coming from subsidiaries of multinational 
enterprises) (...), a viable activity may spring up (and in that way fill some empty cells of the input-output 
table).” 
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In the case of Nien Hsing Textile Co. we are unable to perceive any significant technology 
transfers to the agents of the Nicaraguan economy.  
 
The maquiladora subsidiary did not employ local qualified personnel (nearly all the managers 
were expatriates). Its Nicaraguan employees, who worked on the production line, acquired a 
simple and fragmented technical skill that was of no great use for the local industry. The same 
situation, with regard to employment, existed in the Nicaraguan installations owned by other 
maquiladora enterprises of Asian capital (see MEC, 2003; Bilbao, 2006). As J.-L. Rocha (2006) 
wrote ironically, on the subject of Elena, a shop floor worker in the final inspection division of a 
maquiladora factory: 
 
“Elena learned to better observe the clothes that she bought and to be a little sharper in spotting 
dropped stitches and poor sewing work. There was a transfer of technology in the area of the 
detection of defective finishing.” 
 
As for spin-offs, it is difficult for them to occur. There are very few local managers in the 
maquiladora subsidiary that could create their own business by taking advantage of their 
accumulated experience. 
 
In the same way, the maquiladora subsidiary had practically no ties with local suppliers of 
material inputs (all the material inputs, except the pumice stone were imported), neither with 
local enterprises or workshops to outsource some of its processes (drying, ironing, etc.). This 
absence of linkages with local enterprises characterizes the whole maquiladora manufacturing 
industry in Nicaragua (see Bilbao, 2003). 
 
Why do the maquiladora enterprises have no relations with local (non-maquiladora) 
enterprises?  
 
Firstly, the international subcontracting system in which the maquiladora enterprise participates 
forms a barrier to maintain linkages with local enterprises. In the CMT subcontracting modality, 
it is difficult for the enterprise to use locally produced intermediate goods (cut fabric, buttons, 
zippers), since the customer supplies them. In the full-package subcontracting modality, the 
maquiladora enterprise is responsible for obtaining the intermediate goods. There are thus more 
opportunities for a local supply of these goods, provided, of course, there are local suppliers and 
that they are sufficiently competitive (see Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003). However, as J. Bair 
and E. Dussel Peters (2006) observed, the foreign capital aspect of the maquiladora enterprise 
offering full-package, can form a barrier to its embededdness in the host economy. Decision-
making concerning the purchasing of intermediate goods generally takes place in the 
headquarters, Taiwanese managers in Nicaragua know very little about the local manufacturing 
enterprises and prefer to buy their intermediate inputs to known and trustworthy suppliers. 
 
Secondly, the weak development of the Nicaraguan manufacturing industry forms an 
impediment to the establishment of relations between the maquiladora subsidiary and local 
enterprises or family workshops. Process (sub)subcontracting is limited by quality problems. 
Local enterprises or family workshops are unable to respond to the requirements in terms of 
quality and delivery delays. And most of the material inputs needed (fabric, zippers, thread, etc.) 
are simply not produced in Nicaragua and, when they are, the local suppliers do not offer the 
necessary requirements in terms of quality and delivery.   
 
In Nicaragua, the maquiladora companies are in their vast majority of foreign capital. The 
presence of these foreign companies seems not (yet?) to have encouraged local entrepreneurs to 
engage in the clothing maquiladora industry (in December 2006, 5 out of the 56 maquiladora 
establishments in the clothing sector are of Nicaraguan capital and they employ only 1.400 of 
 21
the 69.070 workers of these clothing industry establishments (2%)28). In this aspect, Nicaragua 
is different from the other DR-CAFTA countries where the presence of national maquiladora 
enterprises in the clothing industry is relatively more important (CEPAL, 2007; OIT, 1997). 
 
2. The “swallow enterprise” (empresa golondrina) 
 
The question of the mobility potential of the foreign enterprises’ seems important to us, because 
it can counter the insertion of its production facility (the subsidiary) into the host economy. This 
affects, in consequence, negatively its economic impact. The foreign enterprise that wishes to 
maintain its mobility capacity has what H. Krifa and F. Héran (1999) call a “passive approach to 
the territory”: it limits itself to exploiting the available useful resources in the territory. It has no 
interest in building up resources in the territory – “the active approach to the territory” – such 
as, for example, training workers exhaustively or collaborating with local suppliers. 
 
The maquiladora subsidiary offers a perfect illustration of this passive approach to the territory 
(see also Mortimore, 2003): it rents buildings in the free trade zone29, it uses easily-
transportable, rapidly depreciated and old equipment goods, it has no relationships with local 
suppliers, it employs expatriate managers and poorly-qualified local personnel, as a general rule, 
it does not train Nicaraguan workers and, finally, labour turnover is high30. Therefore, the 
maquiladora enterprise can, if it wishes, easily fly off to other horizons. There are many other 
countries eager to welcome it. That is why in Central America, the maquiladora enterprise is 
often called the “swallow enterprise” (empresa golondrina).  
 
This mobility capacity gives it moreover an important bargaining power in its negotiations with 
worker representatives, who must limit their demands, and with the country’s authorities, which 
are forced to offer all of the advantages of a free trade zone in order that the foreign investor 
deigns to come to, and stay in, the country. As J. Bilbao (2003) writes: 
 
“With this “we go” threat, (the managers of the maquiladora enterprises operating in Nicaragua) 
won in all the conflicts (and in all the negotiations).” 
 
3. The subsidiary’s upgrading myth 
 
If the foreign maquiladora investment that Nicaragua can attract, in the first instance, is an 
unstable investment with a low potential for technology transfer, there still remains the hope of 
the gradual upgrading of the subsidiary over time: it will perform increasingly complex 
activities and will become progressively more embedded in the territory. If such an upgrading 
comes about, the subsidiary will gradually become a better knowledge transmitter. 
 
The Nien Hsing Textile Co. case shows that the upgrading of the manufacturing subsidiary over 
time is in no way guaranteed. Fundamentally, the maquiladora subsidiary in 2007 was in the 
same situation as it was in 1998. It continued to be characterized by an absence of integration 
                                                     
28 Data of the Comsión Nacional de las Zonas Francas. 
29 As the former executive secretary of the Corporación de las Zonas Francas remarked laconically 
(interview), it is necessary to offer the buildings in the free trade zones for rent to the foreign 
maquiladoras enterprises because otherwise they wouldn’t come: “the building cannot be brought along 
(to another place), the machines can.” 
30 Note that at the more general level the demand for poorly-qualified work to perform manual and 
repetitive tasks may also constitute a factor slowing down training of the workforce of the territory, from 
the point of view of the own incentives of the worker. Indeed, why do you need to train if the 
maquiladora enterprise does not look after trained employees and the ‘best’ employment position you can 
get access to is the one of supervisor or jefe de línea? 
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into the host economy. The subsidiary, just as all the other maquiladora plants set up in 
Nicaragua, continued to manufacture basic or standard garments. It had not evolved towards the 
manufacture of higher-range fashion or differentiated garments. This is a pity, because such an 
evolution would have allowed Nicaragua to benefit from another location advantage: its 
proximity to the United States vis-à-vis the Asian countries, and not to depend solely on a 
precarious trade policy location advantage. Indeed, the manufacture of this type of garment 
requires a short lead time on the part of the manufacturer to the customers’ orders which favours 
geographical proximity between the assembly location and the market (Abernathy et al., 2005, 
OIT, 1997; The Economist, 2004)31. 
 
4. The evolution of the maquiladora industry: Industrial upgrading or 
race to the bottom? 
 
Two points of view exist about the process triggered by the maquiladora industry or export 
oriented manufacturing.  
 
In the optimistic scenario, assembly of basic or standard garments or shoes is the first step of the 
industrialization of the country. This low wages export manufacturing industry places the host 
country on the road to industrialization (see, for example, Romer, 1993; The Economist, 1998). 
As S. Radelet (1999: 31-32) asserts: “a country assembling shoes is not likely to get stuck at 
that stage; experience, education, and further physical investments will lead from footwear to 
electronics assembly, and from electronics assembly to more sophisticated consumer goods, and 
from there to automotive components, heavy machinery, and perhaps on to high-technology 
goods.” 
 
In the pessimistic scenario, the fact that more and more countries are entering into the assembly 
for export manufacturing will cause a decline of the remuneration of this assembly service for 
the host economy. More specifically, the real wages (the most important component of the 
national value added) could be forced to fall to continue to attract the mobile maquiladora 
activity toward the country (see Kaplinsky, 1993;  Mortimore, 2003). 
 
We do not know the answer but we would lean more towards the pessimistic scenario. The 
nature of the maquiladora industry in Nicaragua does not seem to have experienced a 
significant change. Like in 1998, the Asian clothing maquiladora enterprises assemble basic or 
standardized products, employ poorly qualified personnel, its managers are expatriates, it does 
not have linkages with local enterprises, and its permanence in Nicaragua depends on a trade 
policy advantage offered by the United States with an expiry date. In addition, there are very 
few clothing maquiladora enterprises of national origin. Finally, the price in US$ of the product 
offered by the maquiladora enterprise has been falling in the last years.     
 
So, does the maquiladora industry really contribute to a sustainable (long-term) industrial 
development of Nicaragua? We do not think so. It seems more like a “pan para hoy, hambre 
para mañana” (bread for today, hunger for tomorrow) manufacturing enclave.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 For example, Zara stores receive their clothing with new designs every two weeks. This means that 
Inditex (the Spanish group to which Zara belongs) must manufacture two-thirds of its articles in Spain 
and in other countries close to its market, such as Portugal, Morocco and Turkey (Rohwedder and 
Johnson, 2008). 
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